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Abstract 
 
The welfare implications of intellectual property protection (IPP) for private sector agricultural 
research are analyzed, focusing on the realistic cases in which countries provide different IPP 
levels, technology spills over across countries, and the public sector is involved in research. A 
model is developed to determine who benefits from, and who should pay for, the associated 
research. The paper contains some interesting results on the implications of a harmonization of 
IPP policies through multilateral agreements or via technology that allows research firms to 
prevent the copying of plants and animals that express traits that have emerged from their 
research. 
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WELFARE IMPACTS OF CROSS-COUNTRY SPILLOVERS 
IN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH 
 
Advances in private sector plant and animal genetics often have applicability outside the country 
where the research was conducted. Historically, firms that conducted successful research and 
development (R&D) have captured some of the international benefits by charging a premium for 
the resulting seedstock. For example, rents associated with improved performance of hybrid 
breeds and varieties can be captured by charging a premium price for these seeds, and this 
premium can be maintained for many generations by controlling access to the purebred parental 
lines. This premium pricing solution has had less relevance in breeds and varieties where the 
commercial traits are passed on in retained seeds and in the offspring of commercial farm 
animals. Until relatively recently, the only way to capture any benefits associated with these 
breeds and varieties has been to charge a premium for the first generation knowing that the 
producer will replicate this improvement in future generations. 
Governments have attempted to stimulate private sector agricultural R&D by providing 
legal protection for intellectual property in both domestic and international markets. However, 
the ability of countries to impose intellectual property rights on farmers in other countries has not 
been universally accepted (WG-FAO 2001). In some instances, the private sector has been 
willing to conduct R&D even when little intellectual property protection (IPP) was afforded in 
one or two major markets. For example, work on Roundup Ready soybeans progressed despite 
the relative lack of IPP for this technology in some major soybean growing countries (i.e., Brazil 
and Argentina), because legal IPP was available in the U.S. domestic market. 
In the present article we focus on the welfare implications of legal IPP in agriculture 
when the associated R&D has commercial application in more than one country. Agricultural 
markets tend to be unique in that the customer is a farmer who sells the resulting crop or 
livestock product into competitive domestic and international markets. The farmer further may 
have the option of using unimproved genetics, or possibly the newly developed technology from 
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crops and animals grown in previous years. The present study develops a model that allows 
policy makers and those who design domestic and international mechanisms to protect 
intellectual property to determine who benefits from, and who should pay for, the associated 
R&D. 
Recent developments have generated public interest in this topic. First, there has been a 
large reduction in public research capacity in developing countries due in large part to a decline 
in international funding for this research. This suggests that these countries will rely more and 
more on research spillovers from more developed countries to remain competitive. Second, the 
recent development of genetic use restriction technologies (GURTs), popularly known as the 
“terminator gene,” can be viewed as an extreme form of IPP, and this technology has received 
criticism from some less developed countries. Third, the development of Roundup Ready 
soybean seed by Monsanto introduced a new form of IPP in the U.S. marketplace. To access this 
technology, U.S. soybean producers must pay a technology fee of about $7.50 per 50-pound bag 
of Roundup Ready planting seed and must agree not to keep the harvested beans for future 
planting or for re-selling to other farmers (Schnepf 2003). The disparity in the application of this 
technology fee has become controversial because U.S. producers feel that they are paying for 
research that helps their foreign competitors (American Soybean Association 2003). Finally, 
cross-country protection of intellectual property rights in agriculture continues to stimulate 
discussion and controversy at international bodies such as the World Trade Organization via the 
1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (WTO 1994). 
 
Related Research 
The framework developed for the present study is based on a model by Lence et al. (2005), 
which in turn is based on studies by Loury (1979), Lee and Wilde (1980), Dixit (1988), and 
Srinivasan and Thirtle (2002). The single-country model by Lence et al. (2005) is nested within 
the model proposed here and their results can be replicated within the present model by 
restricting the number of countries to one and by eliminating the public sector. 
3 
Related work includes Moschini and Lapan (1997), but they do not consider the incentive 
structure for R&D firms, the welfare impacts that occur after the expiration of the innovator’s 
patent, the uncertainties associated with R&D, spillovers, or the public sector. Other recent 
relevant studies are Alston and Venner (2002) and Tongeren and Eaton (2002), who incorporate 
the incentives for the R&D firms but do not include spillovers, the market for the crop, the 
welfare of those who produce the crop, or the public sector. 
Spillovers in the context of IPP and North-South trade are addressed by Žigić (1998, 
2000). Among other important differences with our model, Žigić equates the intensity of 
spillovers to the strength of IPP and focuses on economy-wide spillovers rather than the 
agricultural research spillovers that are our main interest. Swanson and Goeschl (2000) and 
Goeschl and Swanson (2002) point out that GURTs are a way for innovators to protect their 
intellectual property, and they recognize that this will enhance R&D. They also attempt to 
quantify the potential impact of GURTs on crop yields in developing countries by extrapolating 
the experience with hybrid seeds. Harhoff, Régibeau, and Rockett (2001) discuss GURTs as a 
means by which innovators can exert market power and conclude that GURTs may be beneficial 
because they improve market performance. 
The structure of our model requires simultaneous equilibrium in three markets in each 
country. The seedstock industry must in equilibrium conduct an amount of R&D that can be 
justified by the expected earnings from that research, and each seedstock industry participant 
must respond to incentives and to competition from other companies in an optimal way. The 
market for seeds and breeding stock must also be in equilibrium, and the farmers who purchase 
the improved product should do so only if the premium charged is less than the additional profits 
they can expect. Finally, the domestic and international markets for the final product must be in 
equilibrium, and changes in costs and farm productivity must eventually impact market prices. 
We parameterize the model and simulate the impact of changes in these three factors on 
consumer, producer, and R&D industry welfare in both countries. 
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The model is designed so that, to the extent possible, the inputs required for calibration 
are readily available. To the best of our knowledge, the main difficulty regarding data 
requirements for the proposed model concerns the parameterization of the R&D hazard rate, as 
little empirical research has been performed on this topic. However, this limitation is overcome 
by means of sensitivity analysis using alternative parameterizations. Importantly, the proposed 
model is helpful not only because it can be used to perform empirical analysis when properly 
calibrated but also because it allows potential users to conceptualize the various critical issues 
involved in the evaluation and determination of “optimal” IPP systems for agriculture. We begin 
with the private sector model and extend it to include a public sector that also conducts research. 
 
A Multi-Country Model of Private Investment in Agricultural R&D 
The strength of the IPP regime is embedded in a parameter μq,IPP ≡ μq,right + μcost ≥ 0, which 
measures the maximum markup over the marginal cost of producing x1 (c1) that the developer of 
an improved farm input would be allowed to charge for it in country q.1 The legal IPP level 
μq,right ≥ 0 is increasing with the extent up to which the developer is granted IPP rights on the 
innovation in country q, and with the level of enforcement of such IPP rights in q. Parameter μcost 
≥ 0, on the other hand, reflects the markup advantage enjoyed by the innovator over its 
competitors arising from the costs of transferring or copying the output-enhancing innovation. 
At time 0, R&D firms invest resources to compete in a race to develop x1, a more 
productive version of an existing farm input (e.g., seed, or breed) x0. A successful outcome (x1) 
of the development process is random and the R&D competition ends at time t, when x1 is first 
obtained. The first developer of x1 is granted legal IPP for T periods, so the successful innovator 
could legally charge a price wq,1 = (1 + μq,right + μcost) c1 over the interval [t, t + T] if it found it 
optimal to do so and firms in the industry had no other source of market power. The legal IPP 
level is reduced to zero once the IPP rights expire at time t + T, (i.e., μq,right = 0), so the 
innovator’s maximum allowable markup falls to its cost advantage μcost only. 
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The previous discussion highlights the need to address the various components affecting 
the R&D investment decision at time 0. Such components include the derived demand for the 
improved farm input x1—which in turn involves the end-demand for farm output, the innovator’s 
pricing decision wq,1, the nature of the R&D process, and the determination of equilibrium in the 
R&D market at time 0. Each of these components is the object of the following subsections. 
 
Farm Production 
Let fq(xq0, zq) and gq(xq1, zq) denote the production functions of country q under xq0 and xq1, 
respectively, where zq is a vector of other variable inputs. Assuming for concreteness that x1 is a 
Hicks-neutral improvement in x0, the R&D improvement is represented by gq(xq1, zq) = (1 + αq) 
fq(xq1, zq), with improvement factor αq ≥ −1 and function fq(⋅) assumed to satisfy standard 
regularity conditions. The improvement factor αq will typically differ across countries and may 
even be negative for some countries. However, αq=j > 0 if the new input was specifically 
developed to enhance output in country j. In this instance, sq≠j ≡ αq≠j/αq=j provides a measure of 
the new technology “spillover” to country q ≠ j. For example, sq≠j < 0 means that the new 
technology designed for country j actually reduces output if employed in country q ≠ j. At the 
other extreme, sq≠j > 1 indicates that, even though the new technology was designed for country 
j, it leads to an even greater improvement on the production function of country q ≠ j. 
Given prices Sqp , wq0, wq1, and r associated with farm output y and farm inputs x0, x1, and 
z, respectively, country q’s farm profit functions dual to the “traditional” and “new” technologies 
are (1) and (2), respectively: 
 
(1) πq0( Sqp , wq0, rq) ≡ Sqzx pmax qq [,0  fq(xq0, zq) – wq0 xq0 – rq zq], 
 
(2) πq1( Sqp , w\q1, rq) ≡ Sqzx pmax qq [,1  gq(xq1, zq) – wq1 xq1 – rq zq]. 
 
If farmers can choose either technology, the unrestricted farmers’ profit function is (3): 
 
(3) πq( Sqp , wq0, wq1, rq) ≡ max[πq0( Sqp , wq0, rq), πq1( Sqp , wq1, rq)]. 
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Profit functions (1) through (3) are used below to analyze equilibrium in the output and input 
markets. Farmers are assumed to behave as perfect competitors in all markets. In other words, 
the model assumes that individual farmers do not internalize the effects of their own actions on 
the markets, either for the final crop or for either type of input. 
 
Equilibrium in the Market for Farm Output 
Using Hotelling’s lemma, country q’s farm supply yq* ≡ yq( Sqp , wq0, wq1, rq) is given by (4): 
 
(4) yq* = ⎪⎩
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Supply function (4) is increasing in Sqp  as long as πq0( Sqp , wq0, rq) and πq1( Sqp , wq1, rq) are 
increasing and convex in Sqp . 
Conditional on input prices w0 ≡ [w10, …, wQ0], w1 ≡ [w11, …, wQ1], r ≡ [r1, …, rQ], 
equilibrium in the world market for farm output requires consumer and producer prices to equate 
aggregate crop consumption with aggregate crop output: 
 
(5) ∑
=
Q
q 1
Dq( *Dqp ) = ∑
=
Q
q 1
yq( *Sqp , wq0, wq1, rq), 
 
where Dq(⋅) denotes the Marshallian demand function for the crop in country q, and Dqp  
is the consumer price for the crop in country q. In addition, equilibrium consumer and 
producer prices for the crop and “net exports” must also satisfy condition (6) for all 
countries q and j to rule out arbitrage opportunities: 
 
(6) *Djp  − *Sqp  − ξqj ≤ 0, υqj ≥ 0, ( *Djp  − *Sqp  − ζqj) υqj = 0. 
 
In (6), ξqj represents the wedge between the consumer price in country q and the producer 
price in country j, and υqj is the crop consumption in country q supplied by crop 
producers in country j. The term ξqj captures not only transportation costs but also other 
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frictions such as import tariffs. Further, ξqq > (<) 0 represents a tax (subsidy) on domestic 
consumption met by domestic producers. Conditions (5) and (6) define the vectors of 
equilibrium consumer and producer prices for farm output pD* ≡ [ *1Dp , …, *DQp ] and 
pS* ≡ [ *1Sp , …, *SQp ], respectively, where *Dqp  ≡ (Dqp w0, w1, r, ξ), *Sqp  ≡ (Sqp w0, w1, 
r, ξ), ξ ≡ [ξ1⋅, …, ξQ⋅], and ξq⋅ ≡ [ξq1, …, ξqQ]. 
 
The Innovation Supplier’s Pricing Decision and Input Market Equilibrium 
Application of Hotelling’s lemma yields country q’s derived demands for standard farm 
input xq0* = xq0( Sqp , wq0, wq1, rq) and improved farm input xq1* = xq1(
S
qp , wq0, wq1, rq): 
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It is clear from (5) through (8) that the prices of farm inputs x0 and x1 determine crop output and 
consumption, as well as input usage. This implies that simultaneous equilibrium in the crop and 
input markets requires the specification of the technology used to produce inputs x0 and x1, as 
well as the competitive behavior of the suppliers of such inputs. 
In the interest of space, attention will be restricted to scenarios where the x industry is 
perfectly competitive except for the market power conferred by the legal IPP and the innovator’s 
cost advantage.2 Also for simplicity, it will be assumed that x0 is produced at constant marginal 
cost c0, and that x1 is produced by the innovator at constant marginal cost c1.3 Under perfect 
competition and constant marginal costs c0, the price of the standard farm input x0 is wq0 = c0 for 
all countries q. Hence, if the innovator behaved as a monopoly in each country q, it would set wq1 
= (1
m
qw c0, c1, r, ξ) to maximize profits. That is: 
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(9) mw1  = ∑
=
Q
q
qw wargmax
1
({
1
– c1) xq1[ (Sqp c0, w1, r, ξ), c0, wq1, rq]}. 
 
Embedded in (9) is the pricing constraint imposed by the competition from the traditional input 
being supplied at price c0. Expression (9) also assumes that potential arbitrageurs are not allowed 
to trade the new input across countries to take advantage of price differentials. 
In contestable markets (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 1982), however, the optimal prices 
charged by the innovator for the improved farm input will be (10) instead of (9): 
 
(10) w1* = ∑
=
Q
q
qw wargmax
1
1({1 – c1) xq1[ (
S
qp c0, w1, r, ξ), c0, wq1, rq]}. 
 
subject to: wq1 ≤ (1 + μq,IPP) c1, q = 1, …, Q. 
 
In (10), μq,IPP ≡ μq,right + μcost is the innovator’s effective IPP level in country q. According to 
(10), the extent to which the innovator appropriates the rents from the improved input in country 
q depends on the extra marginal cost incurred by potential competitors to produce x1 (μq,IPP). 
This extra cost arises from two sources, namely, competitors’ technological disadvantage (μcost) 
and legal liability (μq,right). For example, in the instance of a seed innovation, μcost would 
represent the additional costs (in units of c1) associated with transferring the trait without access 
to the original parent lines.4 This cost would obviously be greater for hybrid lines than for open 
pollinated varieties. Further, if the seed innovation has a utility patent, the legal liability cost 
(μq,right) faced by those violating the patent would be determined by the probability of being sued 
and found guilty, and by the penalty imposed on them if convicted. 
In summary, given production costs c0 and c1, the innovator’s degree of market power 
μIPP = [μ1,IPP, …, μQ,IPP], and the values of exogenous variables (r and ζ), (10) yields the 
innovator’s optimal prices for input x1 across countries w1*. In turn, w1* determines equilibrium 
consumer (pD*) and producer (pS*) prices for the crop from (5) and (6), total farm output y* = Σq 
yq* from (4), and the amount of the new input bought by farmers x1* = Σq xq1* from (8). 
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A Firm’s Decision to Invest in R&D 
If the improved input x1 is first obtained at time t and the innovator is granted an effective level 
of IPP rights μq,right through the next T periods, the innovator’s IPP levels will be μq,IPP = μq,right + 
μcost over the interval (t, t + T) and μq,IPP = μcost afterward. Hence, at time t the present value of 
the rents extracted by the successful innovator are given by (11): 
 
(11) v(c0, c1, r, ξ, μright, μcost, T, i) = ∫ ∑+
=
+=⋅−⋅
Tt
t
Q
q
qq costrightqIPPq
xcw
1
111 ,,
|)}( ])({[ μμμ  exp(− i τ) dτ 
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1
111 ,
|)}( ])({[ μμ , 
 
where i is the continuously-compounded interest rate per unit of time and τ is a variable of 
integration. The terms Σq{[wq1(⋅) – c1] xq1(⋅)} represent the rents per unit of time accruing to the 
innovating firm. The present value of each period’s rents is obtained by discounting them at the 
appropriate discount rate i by means of exp(− i τ). Finally, the present value of the discounted 
rents over the entire period is obtained by integrating with respect to time. 
R&D firms must decide whether to attempt to develop x1 and obtain the associated IPP 
before x1 exists. Here, such a decision is represented by means of the standard model of R&D 
competition advanced by Loury (1979) and Lee and Wilde (1980). This model postulates that 
there are N identical R&D firms. To participate in the competition to develop the improved farm 
input x1, firm n must make a lump-sum R&D investment (e.g., physical capital) kn and then incur 
a recurrent cost (e.g., labor) ln. R&D sunk cost kn and recurrent cost ln jointly determine the 
firm’s hazard rate hn = h(kn, ln), where h(⋅) is concave, twice continuously differentiable, strictly 
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increasing, and satisfies h(0, 0) = limk→∞h1(⋅) = liml→∞h2(⋅) = 0. The firm’s hazard rate hn is the 
conditional probability that it will succeed in developing the improved x1 in the next small unit of 
time, given that no firm has succeeded so far. Individual firms’ hazard rates are thus functions of 
the respective lump-sum investments and recurrent costs, but are independent of the length of 
time elapsed since the R&D competition started.5 
The aggregate hazard rate for the R&D industry (H) is obtained by adding up the 
individual hazard rates: 
 
(12) H = ∑
=
N
n
nn lkh
1
),( . 
 
Given that H is the hazard rate for the R&D industry, the probability that no firm has won the 
race by time t is exp(− H t). Further, if no firm has won the race, the probability that firm n (who 
invested kn at the starting time 0) will win the R&D race in the next infinitesimally small interval 
(t + dt) is hn dt. Hence, the unconditional probability that such a firm wins the R&D race over the 
interval (t, t + dt) is exp(− H t) hn dt, and the present value of the expected rents associated with 
such a victory equals v(⋅) exp(− i t) exp(− H t) hn dt. As of time 0, the present value of the 
expected rents to firm n from winning the R&D race is the sum of the latter expression over all 
future infinitesimal time intervals. That is: 
 
(13) ∫
∞
⋅
0
)(v  exp(− i τ) exp(− H τ) hn dτ = v(⋅) hn/(i + H). 
 
In addition to the lump-sum kn invested at time 0, R&D firm n will incur the recurrent 
cost ln until the race is over. The expected present value of the recurrent costs is (14): 
 
(14) ∫ ∫∞ ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −
0 0
00
1
 )  ( 
τ
ττ diexpln  exp(− H τ1) H dτ1 = ∫
∞ −−
0
1 )]  (  [1  
i
iexpln τ  exp(− H τ1) H dτ1, 
 
             = ln/(i + H). 
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The inner integral on the left-hand side of (14) represents the present value of the recurrent costs 
if the race finished at time τ1, whereas the term [exp(− H τ1) H dτ1] denotes the probability of 
such an event. The outer integral accounts for the fact that the race may finish at any time after 
the lump-sum investment is made. 
With expected returns and expected recurrent costs given by (13) and (14), respectively, 
firm n’s expected profits from investing kn at time 0 to participate in the R&D race are: 
 
(15) V(kn, ln, H(−n); ⋅) = v(⋅) h(kn, ln)/[i + h(kn, ln) + H(−n)] − kn − ln/[i + h(kn, ln) + H(−n)], 
 
where H(−n) ≡ Σj≠n h(kj, lj). The decision problem for expected-profit-maximizing R&D firm n 
consists of choosing *nk  and 
*
nl  so as to maximize V(kn, ln, H(−n); ⋅), given the hazard rate H(−n) for 
the rest of the industry. Optimal values *nk  = k
*(H(−n);⋅) and *nl  = l*(H(−n);⋅) are obtained from the 
first-order necessary conditions for the maximization of (15). 
 
Equilibrium in the R&D Market 
Optimal lump-sum investment and recurrent costs for each of the R&D entrants are obtained as 
indicated in the preceding subsection. Because firms are identical, equilibrium in the R&D 
industry is postulated to be the symmetric Nash equilibrium. That is, the equilibrium optimal 
capital and labor levels for each of the N R&D firms must satisfy conditions (16) and (17): 
 
(16) ke = k*[(N – 1) h(ke, le);⋅], 
 
(17) le = l*[(N – 1) h(ke, le);⋅]. 
 
Therefore, the equilibrium aggregate lump-sum investment and recurrent costs are given by Ke = 
N ke and Le = N le, respectively. Further, from (12), (16) and (17), the equilibrium aggregate 
hazard rate for the R&D industry is: 
 
(18) He = N h(ke, le). 
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The equilibrium industry hazard rate He represents the equilibrium probability that the 
innovation will occur in the next unit of time. Alternatively, quantity 1/He is the equilibrium 
average time that it takes to obtain the innovation. Given Ke, Le, and He, the present value of the 
aggregate total expected R&D costs in equilibrium is Ke + Le/(i + He). 
 
Welfare Analysis 
Let )(0 ⋅eqπ , costrightqIPPqeq μμμπ +=⋅ ,,|)( , and costIPPqeq μμπ =⋅ ,|)(  denote farmers’ equilibrium profits in 
country q before the innovation, after the innovation but under IPP rights, and after expiration of 
IPP rights, respectively. Then, if the innovation occurred at time τ1, the change in country q’s 
producer surplus per unit of time would be zero up to time τ1, costrightqIPPqeq μμμπ +=⋅ ,,|)([  − )](0 ⋅eqπ  
from time τ1 until time τ1 + T, and costIPPqeq μμπ =⋅ ,|)([  − )](0 ⋅eqπ  afterward. Discounting such 
changes up to time zero and adding them up yields the present value of the change in producer 
surplus if the innovation happened at time τ1, which is the term within curly brackets in (19): 
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The present value of the expected change in country q’s producer surplus due to the introduction 
of the improved input x1 (ΔPSq) is computed as in (19) because [exp(− He τ1) He] is the 
probability of the innovation occurring during the interval (τ1, τ1 + dτ1). 
The expected change in country q’s consumer surplus due to the innovation (ΔCSq) can 
be measured in a similar way. That is, define )(0 ⋅Deqp , costrightqIPPqDeqp μμμ +=⋅ ,,|)( , and costIPPqDeqp μμ =⋅ ,|)(  
13 
as country q’s equilibrium consumer prices for the crop before the innovation, after the 
innovation but under IPP rights, and after expiration of IPP rights, respectively. Then, if the 
innovation occurred at time τ1, the change in consumer surplus per unit of time would be zero 
until time τ1, ∫ ⋅⋅ +=)( |)(0 ,,  )(
De
q
costrightqIPPq
De
q
p
p q
dD
μμμ
ζζ  from time τ1 until time τ1 + T, and 
∫ ⋅⋅ =)( |)(0 ,  )(
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p
p q
dD
μμ
ζζ  after time τ1 + T. Discounting and adding up such values yields the 
change in consumer surplus if the innovation occurred at time τ1, shown as the term within curly 
brackets in (20): 
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Expression (20) takes into account the probabilities associated with the innovation taking place 
at different times in the future. 
Still another welfare measure is the equilibrium aggregate present value of expected 
profits for the R&D industry (RDS). This can be computed from (21): 
 
(21) RDS = N V(ke, le, (N − 1) h(ke, le); ⋅]. 
 
That is, RDS is calculated by aggregating (15) across the N R&D firms. 
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Public Investment in Agricultural R&D 
The R&D model discussed so far has ignored the importance of public sector R&D, implicitly 
considering private sector R&D as separable and additive to public R&D. However, there are 
reasons to be cautious about this assumption. The public sector is often seen as a viable 
substitute for private sector research, and domestic governments and international organizations 
often fund public sector research on yield improvements. In particular, the Consultative Group 
on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) supports fifteen centers located throughout the 
world with a mission to foster agricultural growth through the provision of public goods (see 
http://www.cgiar.org/who/index.html). 
The question as to whether private research substitutes for, or complements public 
research has been controversial. For example, Wright and Pardey (2006) have shown that the 
bulk of public sector work on transgenic crops in developing countries involve traits developed 
in the U.S. They also report on a survey of stakeholders with interest in plant breeding in 
developing countries indicating that U.S. patents adversely affected their research. Graff et al. 
(2004) report that inefficiencies in accessing intellectual property (e.g., legal costs and uncertain 
ownership rights) appear to be hindering public sector research on some horticultural crops, an 
argument that can easily be extended to orphan crops in developing countries. Another problem 
that has received attention is the possible reduction in the public sector’s “freedom to operate” 
due to existing patents on the research tools themselves (see, e.g., Binenbaum et al. 2003). 
The interaction between private and public sector R&D is important because, as pointed 
out by Evenson and Gollin (2003), many historically important genetic improvement projects in 
the developing world were based on productive plant types developed in the North and then bred 
for location-specific traits in the South. The literature discussed above suggests that private 
sector IPP when improperly designed can hamper valuable public sector R&D, and in this case 
the additional value created by stronger private sector IPP will be offset by reduced effectiveness 
of public sector research. 
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The model introduced in the previous section can be modified to incorporate public R&D 
investment. However, such an exercise requires the specification not only of the public sector’s 
R&D technology but also the public sector’s objective function. Here, we assume that the public 
sector’s technology is identical to the one used by the private sector, thus implying that public 
R&D directly competes with private R&D. As per the public sector’s objective function, it is 
assumed that the public sector is exogenously mandated to use a proportion B of the total labor 
and capital used by the private sector in R&D, and (if successful in its R&D endeavor) to sell the 
innovation x1 at marginal cost.  
There are other ways of specifying the interaction between the public and private sectors, 
but these involve strategic interactions that would needlessly complicate the model. The way we 
have approached the issue is to assume that the public sector conducts R&D based on the same 
criteria as the private sector. For example, both sectors will focus more on economically 
important crops that are specific to economically important growing areas. This assumption sets 
up the public sector as a substitute for the private sector. We do not explore the situation where 
the public sector is a complement to the private one, as would be the case where the former does 
basic research and the latter applies such research. This complementary research relationship 
does not appear to be controversial. 
To incorporate the public sector, the equations presented in the previous section that 
require modifications are re-specified below using the same numbers as before, but with an 
apostrophe. So for example, the expected profits to firm n from investing the lump-sum kn at 
time 0 in the presence of public R&D is represented by equation (15’) instead of (15): 
 
(15’) V(kn, ln, K(−n), L(−n), H(−n); ⋅) = v(⋅) h(kn, ln)/[i + h(kn, ln) + H(−n) + hB]  
 
− kn − ln/[i + h(kn, ln) + H(−n) + hB], 
 
where K(−n) ≡ Σj≠n kj, L(−n) ≡ Σj≠n lj, H(−n) ≡ Σj≠n h(kj, lj), and hB ≡ h[B (kn + K(−n)), B (ln + L(−n))] is 
the public sector’s hazard rate. 
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Optimal values *nk  = k
*(K(−n), L(−n), H(−n);⋅) and *nl  = l*(K(−n), L(−n), H(−n);⋅) are obtained 
from the first-order necessary conditions for the maximization of (15’). In equilibrium, the 
optimal lump-sum investment and recurrent costs for each individual firm are given by (16’) and 
(17’), respectively, whereas the aggregate hazard rate is given by (18’): 
 
(16’) ke = k*[(N − 1) ke, (N − 1) le, (N − 1) h(ke, le);⋅], 
 
(17’) le = l*[(N − 1) ke, (N − 1) le, (N − 1) h(ke, le);⋅], 
 
(18’) He = N h(ke, le) + h(B N ke, B N le). 
 
Therefore, equilibrium aggregate lump-sum investment and recurrent costs can be calculated as 
Ke = (1 + B) N ke and Le = (1 + B) N le, respectively. 
The introduction of public-sector R&D affects the welfare analysis both directly and 
indirectly. The indirect impact stems from the changes in equilibrium lump-sum investments, 
recurrent costs, and aggregate hazard rate induced by the public-sector R&D, as given by (16’) 
through (18’) instead of (16) through (18), respectively. In essence, the public sector’s indirect 
effect is due to the change in the expected time until innovation. 
In contrast, the public sector’s direct impact arises from the zero-markup marginal-cost 
pricing of x1 when the public sector is the successful innovator. To see this, note that the 
unconditional expected change in country q’s producer and consumer surpluses can be expressed 
as (19’) and (20’), respectively: 
 
(19’) ΔPSq = e
ee
H
lkNh ),(  ΔPSq(⋅)|Success=Priv + e
ee
H
BNlBNkh ),(  ΔPSq(⋅)|Success=Pub, 
 
(20’) ΔCSq = e
ee
H
lkNh ),(  ΔCSq(⋅)|Success=Priv + e
ee
H
BNlBNkh ),(  ΔCSq(⋅)|Success=Pub. 
 
The terms ΔPSq(⋅)|Success=Priv and ΔPSq(⋅)|Success=Pub (ΔCSq(⋅)|Success=Priv and ΔCSq(⋅)|Success=Pub) are 
the expected changes in country q’s producer (consumer) surpluses conditional on the successful 
innovator being respectively a private firm and the public sector, whereas the terms N h(ke, le)/He 
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and h(B N ke, B N le)/He are the corresponding probabilities. The expressions for 
ΔPSq(⋅)|Success=Priv and ΔCSq(⋅)|Success=Priv are like (19) and (20), respectively, except for the 
aggregate hazard rate being given by (18’) instead of (18). In contrast, the public sector’s 
marginal cost pricing of x1 means that ΔPSq(⋅)|Success=Pub and ΔCSq(⋅)|Success=Pub must be computed 
as (22) and (23), respectively: 
 
(22) ΔPSq(⋅)|Success=Pub = ∫∫ ∞ =∞ −⋅−⋅
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where the equilibrium aggregate hazard rate is defined by (18’). 
To calculate expected changes in societal welfare, the introduction of public-sector R&D 
requires consideration of the expected change in the surplus of the public R&D sector. Under the 
stated assumptions, the latter surplus consists simply of the (negative of the) sum of the public-
sector’s lump-sum investment and the present value of the public sector’s recurrent costs until 
the innovation is obtained. In equilibrium, the public R&D sector’s expected change in surplus is 
calculated as: 
 
(24) PUS = − B N [ke + le/(i + He)], 
 
where ke, le, and He are given by (16’), (17’), and (18’), respectively. 
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Simulation Specification and Parameterization 
We resort to simulations to analyze the implications of technological spillovers and public 
research on equilibrium welfare and R&D. The simulations require specifying functional forms 
for each country’s crop production and demand, and for the hazard rates of the individual R&D 
firms. Crop production functions under the traditional input are postulated to exhibit constant 
elasticity of substitution between inputs and decreasing returns to scale (so as to yield upward-
sloping crop supply curves): 
 
(25) fq(xq0, zq) = Fq {[ qqxa
σ/1  qqqx
σσ /)1(
0
−  + )1/()1/(/)1( }] qqqqqqqz
ηησσσσ +−− , 
 
where Fq > 0 is a scaling parameter, σq ≥ 0 is the elasticity of substitution between inputs xq0 and 
zq, and ηq > 0 is the constant elasticity of crop supply. Parameter aqx > 0 determines the share of 
total costs due to input xq0, as the cost share equals aqx qqw
σ−1
0 /(aqx qqw
σ−1
0  + qqr
σ−1 ). 
The farm profit function associated with (25) is: 
 
(26) πq0(pq, wq0, rq) ≡ qqηη  (1 + )1() qq ηη +−  qqF η+1  qqp η+1  (aqx qqw σ−10  + )1/(1 ) qqqqr σησ −−− . 
 
Technology and profits under the improved input (gq(xq1, zq) and πq1(pq, wq1, rq), respectively) are 
straightforward to obtain from (25) and (26) by noting that gq(xq1, zq) = (1 + αq) fq(xq1, zq). Crop 
demand is assumed to be isoelastic for each country, so that Dq(pq) = Dq qqp
ε− , where Dq > 0 is a 
scaling parameter and εq > 0 is country q elasticity of demand for the crop. Finally, the hazard 
rate function of each individual R&D firm is represented by the decreasing returns to scale 
Cobb-Douglas technology h(k, l) = A Kkκ  Llκ , where A is a scaling parameter, and κK > 0 and κL 
> 0 are constants such that κK + κL < 1. 
Given the postulated functional forms, simulating the model for Q countries entails 
specifying values for 2 Q demand parameters (εq and Dq), 6 Q supply parameters and exogenous 
variables (ηq, σq, aqx, Fq, αq, rq), Q legal IPP parameters (μq,right), and Q2 transaction cost 
parameters (ζqj). In addition, values must also be specified for the length of time during which 
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IPP rights are enforced (T), the interest rate (i), the competitive disadvantage cost (μcost), the cost 
of producing old seed (c0) and new seed (c1), the productivity of labor and capital in the R&D 
process (κL and κK), the number of R&D firms (N), and the relative size of the public R&D 
sector (B). Therefore, to simplify matters, we restrict attention to simulations involving just Q = 
2 countries with frictionless crop transactions (ζqj = 0) and identical parameters except for 
improvement factors (αq) and legal IPP parameters (μq,right). “Home” denotes the country for 
which the new input is developed and “Rest-of-the World” (ROW) denotes the country receiving 
the technological spillover. Because of the frictionless transactions, in equilibrium consumer 
prices equal producer prices for the crop. 
The parameterizations we use are based on those in Lence et al. (2005). The conclusions 
reached hold for a wide range of parameter values. For the purpose of reporting results, the 
benchmark scenario with no public R&D (i.e., B = 0) was parameterized with η = 1.5, ε = 0.5, σ 
= 0.3, cost share = 10 percent, T = 20 years, i = 10 percent per year, μcost = 0, κK = κL = 0.4, N = 
5 firms. Other parameters of the model are normalized to unity; these are the price of other inputs 
(r), and the cost of producing old seed (c0) and new seed (c1). Simulations were conducted by 
fixing the home country’s improvement factor at αHome = 10 percent and allowing for spillover 
levels from the home country to ROW (sROW ≡ αROW/αHome) to vary between sROW = 0 (i.e., no 
spillover) and sROW = 1 (i.e., full spillover). To explore the effects of legal IPP, simulations were 
performed for a large range of feasible legal IPP values in the home country (μHome,right), and 
ROW was assumed to either have no legal IPP (i.e., μROW,right = 0) or to have the same level of 
legal IPP as the domestic country (μROW,right = μHome,right) (i.e., the latter scenario represents 
harmonized legal IPP). The effect of public R&D was examined by running simulations with B 
ranging from 0 to 1 (note that B = 1 means that public lump-sum investment and recurrent costs 
in R&D are equal to the aggregate of the analogous private R&D expenditures).6 
In the reported simulations, the home country and ROW were assumed to have identical 
market shares in crop production and consumption.7 Comprehensive sensitivity analyses of 
alternative parameterizations were performed, in particular regarding market shares and 
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elasticities. The results were qualitatively very similar to those that are shown in the figures 
below, apart from some obvious differences in scaling. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The main results from the simulations are summarized pictorially in figures 1 through 18, which 
report expected welfare changes for a range of spillovers and legal IPP levels in the home 
country. Panels A and B of figures 1 through 14 show respectively results for the scenarios 
without and with public R&D (i.e., B = 0 and B = 1). 
Figures 1-8, 13, 15, and 16 correspond to the base scenario with no legal IPP in ROW, 
whereas figures 9-12, 14, 17, and 18 represent the base scenario under harmonization (i.e., where 
the legal IPP in ROW is the same as in the home country). These two alternative scenarios are 
discussed next. 
 
No Legal IPP in ROW 
Figure 1.A shows the present value of the expected change in consumer surplus in the home 
country, under a range of legal IPP levels in the home country and spillover coefficients from the 
home country to ROW. The graph shows that home consumers always benefit from strictly 
positive appropriability (μHome,IPP > 0). When there is no spillover (sROW = 0), the change in 
welfare of the home consumers increases with additional appropriability up to a value of about 
μHome,IPP = 1.4. This increase in consumer welfare occurs because increased legal IPP encourages 
R&D, and R&D reduces the crop price as the new technology enhances the output of farmers in 
the home country. The reduction in consumer welfare change after this maximum point occurs 
because the owner of the new technology captures more and more of the benefits associated with 
it, leaving less room for a reduction in crop prices. However, at even higher legal IPP levels 
(μHome,IPP ≥ 2.1), rent extraction by the owner of the new technology is restricted by the 
possibility of home farmers reverting to the old technology. Hence, the welfare increase of home 
consumers reaches a plateau. 
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As the spillover level is increased from sROW = 0 to sROW = 1, the level of appropriability 
that maximizes the change in consumer welfare increases as well. The logic behind this result is 
that full spillover allows ROW farmers to take full advantage of the new technology, but the 
absence of any legal IPP in ROW means that the owner of the technology cannot capture any 
benefit from its use by ROW farmers. In this situation, the leakage of rents associated with the 
spillover reduces the ability of R&D firms to capture the benefits associated with the new 
technology from all of those who use it. This means that less R&D is done than is optimal from 
the consumers’ standpoint. This rent leakage can be partly offset by increasing the legal IPP level 
in the home country. 
Consumer welfare in the home country increases monotonically with the level of 
spillover. Consumers gain from additional crop output and when R&D conducted in the home 
country leads to additional output from ROW, consumers benefit regardless of their location. 
The welfare response surface of ROW consumers is not shown because it is identical to the one 
shown for the home country. This is true because consumers in the home country and ROW are 
assumed to have the same share of world consumption (50 percent share for each country) in the 
baseline scenario, and all consumers are assumed to face the same prices regardless of where 
they live. In general, consumer welfare is greatest whenever spillover is highest and for 
appropriability μROW,IPP ≥ 2. From the consumers’ perspective, a large amount of spillover 
increases the case for high legal IPP in the home country. This is true because higher 
appropriability in the home country encourages R&D, and this enhances not only the production 
capability of home farmers but also that of farmers in ROW. As ROW has no legal IPP, ROW 
farmers do not have to pay any rents to the innovator. In turn, this allows ROW farmers to offer 
their output to all consumers at a lower price. 
Figure 2.A shows the R&D industry’s welfare surface. This surface is from the same set 
of simulations used to generate the consumer surface described above, and again the shape of 
this surface is insensitive to alternative parameterizations. Starting with a spillover of sROW = 0, 
the welfare of R&D firms increases in the home country’s level of appropriability, but this 
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response flattens when the level of legal IPP exceeds μHome,IPP = 2.1. This flattening occurs 
because farmers in the home country always have the choice of reverting to the unimproved 
breed or variety, and this option limits the monopoly pricing power of the successful R&D firm. 
The welfare of the R&D industry falls as spillover grows. By assumption, the successful R&D 
firm cannot capture any rent from ROW producers. Spillovers allow ROW farmers to capture 
market share from home producers, because home farmers must pay a premium for the improved 
seed that is not charged in ROW. As this change in the competitiveness of home farmers 
decreases the relative size of their crop, it reduces the ability of R&D firms to capture rents from 
them. 
In other simulations that are not reported here, the degree to which the welfare of R&D 
firms falls with respect to the spillover coefficient increases as the elasticity of supply increases, 
and as demand becomes more inelastic. However, the degree to which the welfare of R&D firms 
falls with respect to the spillover is not monotonic in the output share of ROW; the fall is largest 
when ROW’s baseline output share is 50 percent. 
Figure 3.A shows the welfare change surface for producers in the home country under the 
same parameters as the consumer and R&D surpluses described above. Starting with a spillover 
of sROW = 0, we see that producers in the home country benefit slightly from increased legal IPP 
up to the point μHome,IPP = 1.3. This increase in producer welfare is surprising because we assume 
an inelastic demand (ε = 0.5). One would normally expect producers to lose from outward shifts 
in the supply curve when demand is inelastic. The result comes about because appropriability 
increases R&D that enhances the technology available to farmers in the home country, but has no 
direct impact on the technology available to ROW producers. Therefore, such R&D allows 
farmers in the home country to capture market share from producers in ROW. However, when 
we introduce even small amounts of spillovers (e.g., sROW ≥ 0.2), the positive link between legal 
IPP and the welfare of producers in the home country is broken. Producers in the home country 
are generally worse off when appropriability is high and spillovers are greatest. The welfare 
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change surface of ROW producers (see figure 4.A) looks like a mirror image of the welfare 
change surface for producers in the home country. 
Figures 5.A and 6.A show the changes in producer welfare with a much higher demand 
elasticity (ε = 1.5), and all other parameters at the levels used for figures 3.A and 4.A. These 
results are very similar to those shown in figure 3.A and 4.A, respectively, despite the large 
change in the demand elasticity. This result suggests that under a wide range of parameters, 
producers in the home country lose from legal IPP when spillover is positive. 
Figure 7.A shows the change in total surplus for the home country under the same set of 
parameters as used in figures 1.A through 3.A. Total welfare in the home country increases with 
the legal IPP level up to a point, and eventually flattens out as R&D firms are allowed to capture 
rents. Total welfare in the home country achieves its maximum when appropriability equals 
μHome,IPP = 1.6 and spillover is sROW = 0. However, the total welfare of the home country is 
relatively insensitive to the level of spillover. This is true because losses to home farmers and 
R&D firms caused by large spillovers are offset by gains to home consumers. The socially 
optimal level of legal IPP in the home country is slightly larger as the level of spillover increases. 
The aggregate welfare change surface for producers, consumers and R&D firms in both 
countries are depicted in figure 8.A. World welfare rises monotonically with spillovers. Further, 
except for small spillovers (sROW ≤ 0.3), world welfare also rises monotonically with the level of 
appropriability in the home country up to the point where the ability of R&D firms to capture the 
benefits of the research is limited by the ability of the home farmers to revert to the unimproved 
technology. 
The results presented above suggest that as spillovers increase, the welfare of both 
producers and R&D firms in the country with strong legal IPP falls. This clearly acts as a 
disincentive for producers to support stronger IPP and encourages both R&D firms and 
producers to work to reduce spillovers. This is unfortunate because world welfare increases with 
spillovers and it also increases in legal IPP up to a point. An obvious question is whether 
24 
harmonizing legal IPP levels across countries yields a more desirable outcome. Harmonization 
might occur via multilateral agreement or by usage of GURTs. 
It is important to note, however, that the present analysis implicitly assumes that 
spillovers are independent of IPP in the two countries. This may not be the case, especially in 
ROW. As Zilberman et al. (2004) show, lower IPP may lead to less effort to introduce traits of 
various local varieties, thus reducing the gain from the new technology. This may be interpreted 
as a reduction of the spillover, suggesting that only some areas of the spillover-IPP space are 
realistic and thus provide useful information. 
 
Harmonized Legal IPP 
When we conduct welfare comparisons under harmonized legal IPP, the R&D industry benefits 
from both spillovers and appropriability under all parametric assumptions. This result makes 
sense. R&D firms benefit when they are allowed to collect rents in both countries, and the rents 
they obtain from ROW producers depends on the relevance of the research (i.e., the spillover) to 
them. Under harmonized IPP the R&D firms have a much greater incentive to conduct research 
relevant to ROW producers and, as a result, world welfare and ROW welfare under harmonized 
IPP are greater than when ROW does not provide legal IPP. 
Figures 9.A and 10.A show producer surplus in the home country under inelastic and 
elastic demand, respectively. Unlike the scenario without legal IPP in ROW, home producers 
now benefit from both legal IPP and spillovers (up to a point that depends on the demand 
elasticity). The welfare maximizing outcome for home producers occurs when legal IPP is 
μHome,IPP = 1 and spillover equals sROW = 0.5 for the inelastic demand case. For the scenario with 
elastic demand (not shown), maximum home producer surplus is achieved for μHome,IPP = 1.4 and 
sROW = 0.7. 
Producer surplus in ROW for inelastic and elastic demand is depicted in figures 11.A and 
12.A, respectively. These graphs are crucially different from the ones corresponding to no IPP in 
ROW, in that ROW producer surplus does not increase monotonically with spillovers. Indeed, 
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ROW producer surplus is minimized at the same legal IPP and spillover levels at which home 
producer surplus is maximized. 
The producer surplus results under harmonization are counterintuitive. Figures 9.A and 
10.A suggest that home producers would sometimes favor research that is of some relevance to 
ROW producers over research that has no spillovers at all. Analogously, figures 11.A and 12.A 
indicate that ROW producers would sometimes prefer R&D that does not spillover to them rather 
than R&D that can be of some use to them. The answer to this puzzle is that if neither the legal 
IPP level nor spillover is too high, the successful R&D firm is able to extract all potential rents 
from ROW producers, but it cannot do the same with the farmers in the home country. At these 
levels of appropriability and spillover, the new input has a positive impact on ROW output 
technology, but this impact is smaller than the new input’s effect on the home country output 
technology. The R&D firm is able to charge ROW farmers a price that leaves them indifferent 
between the old and the new input, but it cannot do the same with the home country farmers 
(because the legal IPP is not strong enough to allow it). Since expected rents to R&D from ROW 
increase with spillovers and because these rents provide incentives to invest in R&D, the 
resulting R&D can be expected to end up benefiting farmers in the home country at the expense 
of ROW producers when spillovers are in an appropriate range, as home producers gain market 
share at the expense of ROW farmers. 
Comparison of producer surpluses in the home country and ROW shows that, regardless 
of the level of legal IPP, farmers in both countries experience the same level of welfare when 
there is full spillover (sROW = 1). This is to be expected, as the research is of equal relevance to 
producers in both countries, and producers in both countries pay an identical amount for it. 
 
Obsolescence of the Innovative Input 
In real-world situations, the “effective” length of protection enjoyed by the developer of x1 in 
country q is likely to be eroded or eliminated altogether by the introduction of an even more 
productive new input x2 with αq2 > αq.8 This suggests that the sensitivity of cross-country welfare 
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calculations to the effective duration of protection needs to be assessed. To this end, the basic 
model can be generalized to allow input x1 to become obsolete Tq,obsol years after its introduction. 
This can be achieved by setting the effective length of protection in country q as Tq ≡ min(Tq,obsol, 
Tright), where Tright denotes the life of the patent. This implies that the developer of input x1 is able 
to extract monopoly rents for the entire life of the patent if the latter expires before x1 becomes 
obsolete (Tright ≤ Tq,obsol). Otherwise (Tq,obsol < Tright), the innovator only enjoys monopoly rents 
over the period [t, t + Tq,obsol], and receives no rents thereafter. 
The discussion above implies that, if time until obsolescence is taken as exogenous, 
policy-makers can enhance innovators’ incentives by increasing the length of the patent only up 
to the point where Tright = Tq,obsol. Beyond that point, increasing Tright has no effect and the only 
means to affect the incentives to innovate is through the IPP appropriability level μIPP. 
To explore the quantitative and redistributional effects of time until obsolescence, the 
original scenarios were re-estimated using the same length of patent life as before (Tright = 20 
years), but letting the innovation become obsolete considerably before the expiration of the 
patent (Tq,obsol = 6 years). Early obsolescence has two main effects that are illustrated by means 
of figures 13.A and 14.A. Figure 13.A (14.A) depicts the change in the present value of the home 
country consumer (producer) surplus under no legal IPP (harmonized IPP) in ROW and is 
analogous to figure 1.A (9.A). The first effect consists of a ceteris paribus significant reduction 
in the magnitude of the changes in welfare, clearly illustrated by the smaller scale of the vertical 
axis in figures 13.A and 14.A relative to figures 1.A and 9.A, respectively. The second effect is 
to render the changes in welfare more monotonic in the IPP level. For example, in figure 1.A 
without spillovers increasing the level of IPP beyond a certain level translates into reduced 
consumer welfare, but no such reduction is observed in figure 13.A. The explanation for both 
effects is that, for any given level of IPP, early obsolescence prevents the successful innovator 
from extracting as much rents as it would otherwise. Importantly, figure 14.A shows that the 
non-monotonicity of the change in home-country producer surplus with respect to spillovers is 
robust to obsolescence. 
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Gradual Adoption of the Improved Variety 
Another aspect that may be deemed unrealistic about the advocated model is that it assumes that 
the innovation is adopted immediately, whereas in the real world it typically takes some time for 
innovations to diffuse. Slower rates of adoption by potential users reduce the innovator’s rents, 
providing smaller incentives to perform R&D. Therefore, other things equal, the longer it takes 
for an innovation to diffuse, the greater the potential relevance of the IPP level. 
Denoting by ϑqτ ∈ [0, 1] the proportion of farmers in country q willing to adopt the 
innovation τ periods after the latter is introduced, the impact of gradual adoption was assessed by 
conducting simulations with ϑHome,τ = ϑROW,τ = 0 for τ ∈ [0, 0.5), ϑHome,τ = ϑROW,τ = 1/6 for τ ∈ 
[0.5, 1.5), ϑHome,τ = ϑROW,τ = 1/2 for τ ∈ [1.5, 2.5), ϑHome,τ = ϑROW,τ = 5/6 for τ ∈ [2.5, 3.5), and 
ϑHome,τ = ϑROW,τ = 1 for τ ≥ 3.5.9 To save space, graphs for the simulations with gradual adoption 
are omitted, as they are almost undistinguishable from the plots corresponding to immediate 
adoption except for the scale of the welfare changes. Compared to immediate adoption, gradual 
adoption reduced the absolute magnitudes of the welfare changes by around 30 percent to 40 
percent. 
 
Importance of Spillovers for Policy 
The results presented above suggest that if the level of spillover is a choice made by the 
R&D companies, then low IPP in developing counties will result in fewer high-spillover 
innovations. However, if the degree of spillover is random and large, as appears to have 
been the case for hybrid crops, Iowa dent corn and transgenic crops, then producers in 
ROW benefit from weak IPP in their country and strong IPP in the home country, as do 
consumers in ROW (figure 1.A). This result may explain why some countries are reticent 
to impose strong IPP. World welfare is enhanced by strong ROW IPP in both the 
deterministic spillover and random spillover cases, which motivates the international 
focus on harmonization. Further, in the case of random spillovers it may even justify 
compensation to ROW countries to encourage them to adopt stronger IPP. 
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Results with a Public Sector 
Figures 1.B through 14.B show that the shape of the welfare surfaces with a public sector 
spending as much on R&D as the private sector is similar to those for the private sector alone. 
Two major results from these simulations. First, the public sector essentially dilutes the market 
power of the private sector and this eliminates the area of the charts where increased IPP causes 
reduced consumer and societal welfare. Second, the welfare level is influenced by the existence 
of the public sector. Specifically, the amount of consumer surplus is typically 12 percent greater 
with a public sector (without taking into account the tax burden created by the public sector 
expenditures in R&D). The presence of public sector research reduces the amount of private 
sector research, so that aggregate R&D is approximately the same on both scenarios. However, 
because (if successful) the public sector sells the innovation at marginal cost and without 
markup, consumers gain as more producers adopt and as these producers pass along lower input 
costs to consumers. Expected profits of the R&D sector fall by approximately 50 percent, as one 
might expect given that half of the aggregate R&D activities are performed by the public sector. 
Producer surplus is almost identical under both the private and the public/private scenarios. With 
the same amount of aggregate research being performed, the expected impact on the producer 
comes via the lower cost of seed from the public sector. But in equilibrium, producers pass most 
of this lower cost on to consumers. World surplus is very similar under the private sector when 
compared to the public/private sector scenario, as gains by consumers are offset by reduced 
profits to the private R&D sector and the taxes levied to support public R&D (see Figures 15 
through 18). 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
The provision of intellectual property rights in agriculture has gained increased attention as 
governments have attempted to stimulate private sector research and because the recent (as yet to 
be commercialized) development of GURTs makes it possible for the private R&D sector to 
protect farmers from growing future generations of the improved variety. The welfare 
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implications of increased protection of intellectual property in agriculture are different from 
those in the rest of the economy because the customer for the improved product is a farmer who 
uses the technology to produce a final product that is then sold into competitive markets. A key 
contribution of the model presented here has been the acknowledgement that in many instances 
the technology used in agriculture is subject to spillovers. For example, improvements to the 
genetic composition of plants and animals developed in one country are often captured to some 
extent by producers in other countries. This fact has some important implications for welfare 
analysis and for policy prescriptions on where the burden of paying for the research should lie. 
We have paid particular attention to the realistic case where some countries provide legal 
protection for intellectual property, while other countries do not offer such protection. The model 
is designed to replicate the incentive structures and institutions that exist in the seed sector and 
we focus only on results that are robust across changes in key parameters. We have also worked 
with several different formulations of the model presented here and again we focus only on those 
results that were robust across model formulations. However, we acknowledge that, as with any 
formalized model, one should carefully evaluate the degree to which the model accurately 
reflects the real word before using the results to evaluate policies. 
In general, world welfare rises as the amount of research spillover increases, and it 
increases up to an optimal point in the level of intellectual property protection (IPP) offered in 
countries that develop the new technologies. This optimal level of protection also increases as 
spillovers increase because spillovers magnify the benefits of research. In all of the cases we 
examined, the relationship between world welfare and the level of appropriability flattens at high 
levels of appropriability. 
Producers and consumers in countries with no legal IPP generally benefit from legal IPP 
in other countries so long as some reasonable level of spillover exists. Producers in countries 
with strong IPP almost always lose when spillovers exist, whereas consumers in the country 
protecting intellectual property always gain from the existence of spillovers. Whether the latter 
gains are large enough to offset the former losses as spillovers increase depends on the relative 
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magnitudes of the sectors producing and consuming the crop in the country with high legal IPP. 
When the crop production sector is of similar or greater size than the crop consumption sector 
(i.e., when the country is an exporter of the crop), producer losses tend to exceed consumer gains 
as spillovers increase. 
Producers and R&D companies in countries with strong IPP lose from research that is of 
relevance to producers in other countries. If producers and R&D firms respond to this incentive 
and avoid research that might spill over, then world welfare falls. One solution is to harmonize 
legal IPP across countries via agreements or via GURTs. This provides R&D firms with a strong 
incentive to conduct high spillover research and it gives producers in research-oriented countries 
an incentive to support IPP even if this sometimes spills over into other countries. 
When we add a public sector that conducts similar research to the private sector, 
consumers benefit (ignoring taxes paid to support the public sector) and seed companies lose. 
The net impact on total surplus is very small. However, the study focuses on the case where the 
public sector competes with the private sector. Therefore, such conclusions need not apply to 
scenarios where public research is complementary to private R&D, as when the public sector 
performs basic research or does research on orphan crops. The latter are two examples of the 
many potentially fruitful extensions of the model presented here. 
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Notes 
1. Note that the definition of μq,IPP, μq,right, and μcost here is different from the definition of the 
parameters designed with similar notation in Lence et al. (2005). As it will become clear later, 
the former parameters are obtained by rescaling the latter parameters by the marginal cost of 
producing x1 (c1). That is, Lence et al.’s μIPP, μright, and μcost are measured in dollars per unit of 
x1, whereas μq,IPP, μq,right, and μcost here are measured in units of marginal cost c1. 
2. Allowing for market power unrelated to IPP in the x industry may significantly affect the 
results of the model. To illustrate this point, consider the extreme case where the x industry 
consists of a monopoly. Unlike the case of perfect competition, the monopoly scenario will result 
in R&D investment even if there is no legal IPP or cost advantage, provided the new input x1 
allows the monopoly to obtain greater profits than supplying the old input x0. Indeed, conferring 
legal IPP in such a situation will not exert any impact whatsoever on the (monopoly) incentives 
to innovate. In the real world, the R&D industry may have market power for reasons other than 
IPP. However, to focus on the virtues and vices of granting monopoly power targeted at 
promoting innovation, we restrict attention here to the case of perfect competition. The reason 
for this is that non-IPP market power can be conceptually distinguished from the IPP market 
power and it can be legally challenged (e.g., by antitrust laws). 
3. To make the problem interesting, it is also assumed that c1 and c0 are such that the improved 
farm input x1 represents a Pareto improvement over the standard farm input x0 (i.e., that Ω(x1) > 
Ω(x0), where Ω(x1) denotes the welfare to society resulting from the use of x1 only, and Ω(x0) is 
defined in an analogous manner). This requires that the marginal cost of producing x1 not be “too 
large” relative to the marginal cost of producing x0. The condition that c1 ≤ [1 + max(αq)] c0 
ensures that x1 is a Pareto improvement over x0, but it is more restrictive than necessary. 
4. Note that μcost is the same across countries. This assumption is adopted to focus on the impact 
of differential levels of property rights (μq,right) across countries and can be justified if, for 
example, the costs of trading x1 in the absence of legal restrictions were negligible. 
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5. For analytical and numerical tractability, the hazard rate is assumed to be independent of state 
variables. Otherwise, the hazard rate and the recurrent R&D costs would vary with time. Such an 
assumption is unrealistic in that the probability of a real-world firm developing a new variety at 
any point in time is likely to depend on its own (and possibly the industry’s) previous research 
activity. However, it does not invalidate our main conclusions because the study focuses on a 
static ex ante analysis, rather than on the evolution of the hazard rate and the recurrent R&D 
costs. For the present purposes, the main impact of the hazard rate is through the expected time 
until discovery, whereas the hazard rate’s evolution effect is only of second order of significance. 
In other words, the results from our model would be very similar to the results from a model with 
time-varying hazard rates calibrated to have the same expected time until discovery. 
6. As pointed out in footnote 14 of Lence et al. (2005), changing (1 + B) N exerts a “scale” effect 
and a “competition” effect. Following their reasoning, attention is restricted to the competition 
effect by setting A = 1])1[( −++ LKNB κκ , which may be interpreted as normalizing the aggregate 
amount of “fixed” input at unity. To see this, let the hazard rate have constant returns to scale by 
having A = LK κκφ −−1 , where φ is a fixed input. Hence, the aggregate hazard rate is H = (1 + B) N 
h(k, l) = LK κκΦ −−1  KK κ  LLκ , where Φ ≡ (1 + B) N φ, K ≡ (1 + B) N k, and L ≡ (1 + B) N l are the 
aggregate amounts of fixed input, lump-sum investment, and recurrent costs, respectively. The 
advocated normalization consists of setting Φ = 1, so that φ = 1/[(1 + B) N] and A = 
1])1[( −++ LKNB κκ . The profits of the private R&D sector are therefore the returns to their 
corresponding share of the fixed factor N φ = 1/(1 + B). 
7. Different output (consumption) market shares can be simulated by varying FHome and FROW 
(DHome and DROW). Scaling factors are normalized so that FHome + FROW = 1 = DHome + DROW. 
Hence, for example, a 30 percent output (consumption) market share for ROW is obtained by 
setting FROW = 0.3. 
8. An anonymous reviewer informed us that PVP data from EU countries suggests that only 40-
60 percent of PVP certificates survive for more than five years, less than 30 percent survive for 
more than 10 years, and less than 3 percent survive for the full term of legal IPP protection. 
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9. The postulated ϑqτ values imply that, for example, one year after the innovation, 16.7 percent 
of producers in both the home country and ROW adopt x1 if it is more profitable for them do so 
than using x0, whereas the remaining 83.3 percent of producers are unwilling to adopt the 
innovation and keep using x0. 
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A. Without public R&D (B = 0) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
B. With public R&D (B = 1) 
Figure 1. Present value of expected change in home country consumer surplus (ΔCSHome) 
for inelastic demand (ε = 0.5), in the absence of legal IPP in ROW 
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A. Without public R&D (B = 0) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
B. With public R&D (B = 1) 
Figure 2. Present value of expected profits for the R&D industry (RDS) for inelastic 
demand (ε = 0.5), in the absence of legal IPP in ROW 
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A. Without public R&D (B = 0) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
B. With public R&D (B = 1) 
Figure 3. Present value of expected change in home country producer surplus (ΔPSHome) for 
inelastic demand (ε = 0.5), in the absence of legal IPP in ROW 
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A. Without public R&D (B = 0) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
B. With public R&D (B = 1) 
Figure 4. Present value of expected change in ROW producer surplus (ΔPSROW) for 
inelastic demand (ε = 0.5), in the absence of legal IPP in ROW 
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A. Without public R&D (B = 0) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
B. With public R&D (B = 1) 
Figure 5. Present value of expected change in home country producer surplus (ΔPSHome) for 
elastic demand (ε = 1.5), in the absence of legal IPP in ROW 
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A. Without public R&D (B = 0) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
B. With public R&D (B = 1) 
Figure 6. Present value of expected change in ROW producer surplus (ΔPSROW) for elastic 
demand (ε = 1.5), in the absence of legal IPP in ROW 
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A. Without public R&D (B = 0) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
B. With public R&D (B = 1) 
Figure 7. Present value of expected change in home country surplus (ΔCSHome + ΔPSHome + 
RDS + PUS) for inelastic demand (ε = 0.5), in the absence of legal IPP in ROW 
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A. Without public R&D (B = 0) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
B. With public R&D (B = 1) 
Figure 8. Present value of expected change in world surplus (ΔCSHome + ΔCSROW + ΔPSHome 
+ ΔPSROW + RDS + PUS) for inelastic demand (ε = 0.5), in the absence of legal IPP in ROW 
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A. Without public R&D (B = 0) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
B. With public R&D (B = 1) 
Figure 9. Present value of expected change in home country producer surplus (ΔPSHome) for 
inelastic demand (ε = 0.5), under harmonized legal IPP 
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A. Without public R&D (B = 0) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
B. With public R&D (B = 1) 
Figure 10. Present value of expected change in home country producer surplus (ΔPSHome) 
for elastic demand (ε = 1.5), under harmonized legal IPP 
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A. Without public R&D (B = 0) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
B. With public R&D (B = 1) 
Figure 11. Present value of expected change in ROW producer surplus (ΔPSROW) for 
inelastic demand (ε = 0.5), under harmonized legal IPP 
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A. Without public R&D (B = 0) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
B. With public R&D (B = 1) 
Figure 12. Present value of expected change in ROW producer surplus (ΔPSROW) for elastic 
demand (ε = 1.5), under harmonized legal IPP 
Present 
value of 
expected 
change in 
ROW 
producer 
surplus 
(ΔPSROW) 
Legal IPP in home country (μHome,IPP)
Spillover 
(sROW) 
Present 
value of 
expected 
change in 
ROW 
producer 
surplus 
(ΔPSROW) 
Legal IPP in home country (μHome,IPP)
Spillover 
(sROW) 
49 
 
 
 
 
A. Without public R&D (B = 0) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
B. With public R&D (B = 1) 
Figure 13. Present value of expected change in home country consumer surplus (ΔCSHome) 
for inelastic demand (ε = 0.5) and Tq,obsol = 6 years, in the absence of legal IPP in ROW 
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A. Without public R&D (B = 0) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
B. With public R&D (B = 1) 
Figure 14. Present value of expected change in home country producer surplus (ΔPSHome) 
for inelastic demand (ε = 0.5) and Tq,obsol = 6 years, under harmonized legal IPP 
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Figure 15. Present value of expected change in public sector surplus (PUS) for B = 1, 
inelastic demand (ε = 0.5), in the absence of legal IPP in ROW 
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Figure 16. Present value of expected change in public sector surplus (PUS) for B = 1, elastic 
demand (ε = 1.5), in the absence of legal IPP in ROW 
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Figure 17. Present value of expected change in public sector surplus (PUS) for B = 1, 
inelastic demand (ε = 0.5), under harmonized legal IPP 
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Figure 18. Present value of expected change in public sector surplus (PUS) for B = 1, elastic 
demand (ε = 1.5), under harmonized legal IPP 
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